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Abstract
This paper builds on recent conceptual work on associations drawn from the
new institutional economics, and uses evidence from New Zealand wool broking to
indicate the circumstances in which industry associations can operate effectively and
in the broader public interest. The paper also draws comparisons with Australian
practices. Through their strong associative capacity and effective specialisation of
function, wool broking industry associations developed flexible routines for managing
wool auctions, mediated disputes, mitigated opportunism, addressed major market
disruptions, and served as a communicating node with government. External
pressures and monitoring from transactors, governments, and a competitive wool
market constrained rent-seeking behaviour.

1.

INTRODUCTION
Associations are an alternative form of social ordering to that structured by the

community, market and state, and can provide the best public interest outcomes in
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I am grateful to John Singleton for comments on this paper, and David Merrett for his input to
related joint work on the Australian wool broking associations. Three anonymous referees are
thanked for their constructive comments.
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some situations.2 However, they have received negative press under the shadow of
Mancur Olson’s work on the rent-seeking ‘distributional coalition’ during the 1960s
to 1980s.3 Recent work, particularly by Richard Doner and Ben Schneider, has
alternatively emphasized the productive contributions of business associations,
particularly through their ability to resolve exchange, hierarchy, and collective action
sources of market failure in developing economies.4 In practice, many associations
undertake a wide range of strategies that include both redistributive and paretooptimal objectives. The successful pursuit of these goals depends on the strength of
the association’s structure and the environmental constraints that it encounters.
This paper focuses upon industry associations in the New Zealand wool
broking industry, notably the New Zealand Wool Brokers Association (hereafter,
NZWBA) and its regional constituent bodies. Wool has been the nation’s dominant
industry for much of its history and the brokers have played a vital role in facilitating
sales to buyers worldwide. Section 2 of the paper surveys the nature and history of
business associations, and assesses the influences on their efficient operation and
strategic choices. Section 3 examines the evolution, structure, and activities of the
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Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Community, Market, State – and Associations?
The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order”, in Private Interest
Government eds, Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. Schmitter,. Beyond Market and State
(Sage, 1985), 1-29
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Most notably The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, 1982); Logic of Collective Action
(Cambridge, MA, 1965).
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Richard F. Doner and Ben Schneider, “Business Associations and Economic Development:
Why some Associations Contribute more than Others”, Business & Politics 2, 3 (2000): 26188; Richard F. Doner and Ben Schneider, “The New Institutional Economics, Business
Associations and Development”, ILO Discussion Papers 110 (2000): 1-25.
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wool broking associations in New Zealand, focussing on their formative period and
central role in the first half of the twentieth century, and provides comparisons with
the Australian experience. Section 4 concludes the paper with a brief discussion of
some of the broader implications.

2.

INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS

Definition
Industry associations constitute third-party or bridging organisations.5
Members collectively delegate certain rights to a central body, which exercises
‘associational governance’ through a process of structured bargaining. Associations
often represent the interests of members in an industry, but may also represent firms
by size, geographic location (local and national chambers of commerce), function
(importers or exporters, primary producers or manufacturers) or professional group.
Typically, they are funded by member subscriptions, and their governance is
contained in a written constitution.6 While associations come in many forms, in
general they may be distinguished from a wide range of inter-firm structures by dint
of their existence as a separate bridging organisation, independent of individual
members, and in providing reasonably broad representation.

5

Also variously known as business, trade, professional, or employer associations.
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On trade associations see: Marc Schneiberg and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, “Can Transaction
Cost Economics Explain Trade Associations”, in Political Choice. Institutions, Rules and the
Limits of Rationality, eds Roland M. Czada and Adrienne Windhoff-Héritier (Frankfurt am
Main, 1991), 202-4. Hiroaki Yamazaki, “Introduction” in Trade Associations in Business
History. The International Conference on Business History 14, eds Hiroaki Yamazaki and
Matao Miyamoto (Tokyo, 1988) ix-xviii, provides a typology of Japanese trade associations.
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Associations undertake a wide range of activities in pursuit of their strategic
aims. The literature divides their aims broadly into two categories: those that yield
benefits to members at the expense of others (‘rent-seeking’), for example by
successful lobbying for favourable tax or trade treatment; and those that focus upon
improved efficiency in their sector, which may also provide consequential spill over
benefits beyond their membership (‘pareto-optimal’). In practice, rent-seeking and
efficiency motives are difficult to disentangle, for example, price and output
agreements may be viewed as an exercise in market power or an attempt to provide
order and certainty to the benefit of all parties. Different activities draw upon the
same resources of the association, especially in terms of staff, information, and
infrastructure. It may also be instructive to distinguish between motives (ex ante) and
actual outcomes (ex post): a rent-seeking motive may provide unintended growth
benefits as a form of externality, or vice versa in the case of setting accreditation
standards that create entry barriers.7 Motivations are also sensitive to the lifecycle
stage of an association. Initial formation may draw on strategic (market power) and
distributional (offloading risk) objectives; subsequently, members may perceive
efficiency benefits from association.8
Doner and Schneider observe that business associations operate at a mesoorganisational level between markets and hierarchies, which has largely been
overlooked by the new institutional economics. They argue that associations help to
resolve many of the market imperfections that are at the crux of new institutional
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Alfred E. Kahn, “Cartels and Trade Associations,” International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (New York, 1968), 323-4 identified the entanglement of different motives and
outcomes.
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Schneiberg & Hollingsworth, 223-4.
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analysis. They distinguish between the ‘market-supporting’ and ‘marketcomplementing’ activities of associations as means of resolving market failure.
Market-supporting activities involve exerting pressure on governments to increase the
supply of public goods (such as improved infrastructure, stronger property rights, and
the mitigation of official corruption); whereas market-complementing activities
address the supply of club and private goods (such as horizontal and vertical
coordination between firms, accreditation, information flows, and human capital
skills). They facilitate exchange through reducing transaction costs (mediation and
improved information flows), attenuate the need for hierarchy through mitigating
agency problems (reduced information asymmetries), and promote cooperation
through resolving collective action dilemmas (provision of incentives).

History
Historically, a wide range of industry associations has existed. In Britain, the
Limitation of the Vend was an organisation of coal producers that operated
intermittently over the three centuries up to 1850, primarily to regulate output. During
the economic downturn in the final quarter of the nineteenth century, the number of
trade associations expanded rapidly in the face of heightened intra-industry
competition, particularly in traditional staple industries (such as cotton, coal, shipping,
and iron and steel), which were suffering strong competitive pressures in the face of
high fixed costs. Evidence of this trend has been noted for example in Britain,
Germany, Japan, France, Australia, and the US.9 A further burst of activity occurred
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For example see Toni Pierenkemper, “Trade Associations in Germany in the Late Nineteenth
and Early Twentieth Centuries”, and Jean-Pierre Daviet, “Trade Associations or Agreements
and Controlled Competition in France, 1830-1939”, both in Yamazaki & Miyamoto; Grant
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during the interwar slump, frequently with the encouragement of governments,
especially in Japan and the US, who believed they had a positive role in rationalising
industries suffering from excess capacity. In Japan the number of associations rose
sharply at the depth of the downturn, 1929-31, causing them to be labelled ‘children
of the Depression’10.
Contemporary analysis emphasised the rent-seeking motives of associations,
particularly in the form of output and price controls, although achieving market
stability and sharing technical information were also noted.11 An initially negative
view among business historians has undergone revision. Paul Sweezy’s assertion of
the monopoly profits generated by the Vend was challenged, along with Alfred
Chandler’s framework for the supremacy of large-scale enterprise over intermediate
forms of governance.12 The multiplicity of objectives of Japanese industry
associations has been brought to light, particularly their ability to complement the
managerial resources of individual firms, their mediation role, and their willingness to
Fleming, and Dorothy Terwiel, “How Successful was Early Australian Antitrust Legislation?
Lessons from the Associated Northern Collieries, 1906-11,” Australian Business Law Review
(1999), 27, 1.
10

Takeo Kikkawa, “Functions of Japanese Trade Associations before World War II: the Case of
Cartel Organizations”, in Yamazaki & Miyamoto, 60.
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George R. Carter, The Tendency Towards Industrial Combination (Constable, 1913);
Hermann Levy, Monopoly and Competition. A Study in English Industrial Organisation
(London, 1911).
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Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition in the English Coal Trade, 1550-1850.
(Cambridge, MA, 1938). William J. Hausman, “Market Power in the London Coal Trade: the
Limitation of the Vend, 1770-1845,” Explorations in Economic History 21 (1984), 383-405.
Alternative perspectives are summarised in Gordon Boyce and Simon Ville, The Development
of Modern Business (Basingstoke, 2002), 21-7.
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serve as a conduit between firms and governments.13 Louis Galambos has reassessed
his own work on trade associations to emphasise their contribution to technical
change, and Arthur McIvor’s study of British employers’ associations explains their
role in dispute resolution.14
Two recent studies of industry associations are particularly noteworthy for
their revision of the rent-seeking perspective. Gordon Boyce’s account of the
Pharmaceutical Society of Australia (formed in 1857) describes its role in the
diffusion of information and knowledge among its members, monitoring professional
standards, fostering cooperative behaviour, and communicating with other groups.
Insofar as the Pharmaceutical Society of Australia pursued rent-seeking objectives,
this was sought through elevating the status of their members rather than by direct
manipulation of prices and output.15 Francesca Carnevali shows how the Birmingham
Jewellers Association (formed in 1887) provided stability and mitigated dishonest and
destructive behaviour during an economic downturn. By establishing a code of
conduct, it replaced or reinforced costly and slow court ordering with crafted private
ordering.16
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Matao Miyamoto, “The Development of Business Associations in Prewar Japan” in Yamazaki
& Miyamoto.
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Louis Galambos, “The American Trade Association Revisited” in Yamazaki & Miyamoto;
Arthur J. McIvor, Organised Capital: Employers Associations and Industrial Relations in
Northern England, 1880-1939 (Cambridge, 1996).
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Gordon Boyce, “A Professional Association as Network and Communicating Node: the
Pharmaceutical Society of Australia, 1857-1918,” Australian Economic History Review 39, 3
(1999), 277-81.
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Francesca Carnevali, “Crooks, Thieves, and Receivers: Transaction Costs in NineteenthCentury Industrial Birmingham,” Economic History Review 2nd ser., 57, 3 (2004): 533-50.
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Associative capacity and strategic choices
The ability of industry associations to pursue particular strategies depends on
their internal organisational strength and external pressures and conditions.17 Their
strength, or associative capacity, depends on the nature and benefits of membership.
High member density, or encompassment, is a central to associative capacity. Where
a company never joins, or when it exits, this weakens the association’s influence over
the industry, its claim to speak representatively, and it risks free riding by nonmembers, and the emergence of a rival association or group. Where high density is
achieved through a small number of members in a concentrated industry, this reduces
the costs of administering the association, particularly in securing cooperation,
participation, and honest behaviour.
The most effective way to ensure high density is to make membership of the
association highly attractive. It may provide club goods, where tangible benefits
accrue solely to members, such as bulk purchase discounts. The shared cost of, and
access to, a common infrastructure is another possible benefit. Some services
provided by associations possess public good properties, such as lobbying on behalf
of the industry, although they risk collective action (free riding) behaviour by nonmember firms in the industry. Intangible selective benefits provide additional
inducements, particularly the reputation signals that membership emits. Membership
is an explicit signal of trustworthiness and creditworthiness, where defaulters and
bankrupts are expelled. Many associations are active in setting and amending forms
of industry accreditation. Marc Law and Sukko Kim viewed occupational licensing
regulation in the US as a response to increased knowledge specialisation that made it
17

See Doner & Schneider, “Business Associations”, 270-5.
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difficult for consumers to judge the quality of services. Thus, licensing was motivated
by the public interest question of mitigating information asymmetries.18 The ability of
associations to mediate disputes among members can provide a more swift,
transparent and low cost resolution than with court ordering. In turn, such explicit and
implicit signals strengthen the enforcement powers of associations, because expulsion
is more damaging to reputation than non-membership. An association can also
provide a forum for sharing tacit knowledge, which is transferred through close
interaction and learning by doing.
Tensions and divisions can still plague an association as members jostle for
leadership, seek to defend their territory, and form alliances based upon particular
interests. Commonalities in the social and professional background and aspirations of
the members may foster an innate sense of cooperation.19 This may reflect social
linkages and a shared history (heritage) and position in the industry. Active
participation and close interaction is preferable to passivity and distance in building
associational cooperation. The expression of members’ ‘voice’ encourages a wider
range of interaction, heightening trust, consensus, loyalty, and other forms of social
capital, while providing a greater range of expertise in decision making and closer
monitoring of the association’s officers.
Drawing on the evolutionary economics literature, one might expect
associations, like firms, to be able to reproduce standard routines from practice as part

18

Marc T. Law and Sukkoo Kim, “Specialization and Regulation: the Rise of Professionals and
the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation,” Journal of Economic History 65, 3
(2005): 723-56.

19

Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: a Theory of Embeddedness,”
American Journal of Sociology, 91, 1985: 481-510.
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of an organisational memory.20 Routines constitute a recognised and accepted
procedure, thereby economising on transaction costs. Routines themselves may
evolve. The most enduring influences on associative capacity are the ability to learn
(from previous similar circumstances) and to adapt (to new circumstances). Learning
provides an improved response to a particular situation and requires cognitive skills
but also memory. Therefore, human capital levels and record-keeping practices are
important. An association must adapt to changes in its industry’s position, to the
shifting dynamics among its members, and indeed its changing membership
composition. Its ability to respond effectively to these dynamics in a manner that
sustains trust and cooperative participation is vital to its effectiveness. Associations
can behave as adaptive institutions in several ways, most notably through possessing a
governance structure that is responsive to change.21
While associative capacity explains how effectively an association can pursue
its aims, the nature of those aims is strongly conditioned by pressures in the external
environment. Doner and Schneider argue that ‘third party enforcement’, particularly
by competitive international markets or governments, will pressure associations
towards efficiency motives.22 As firms experience ‘market vulnerability’ during

20

Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change
(Cambridge, MA, 1982); Jan Fagerberg, “Schumpeter and the Revival of Evolutionary
Economics: an Appraisal of the Literature,” Journal of Evolutionary Economics 13, 2 (2003):
125-59.

21

Douglass C. North, “Understanding the Process of Economic Change” (Institute of Economic
Affairs Occasional Paper 106, London, 1999), 18 refers to the importance of adaptive
institutions to the economic development of nations.

22

Doner & Schneider, “Business Associations”, 275-8.
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economic downturns, their focus is on trying to cut costs for their members.
Increasing market power is also much more difficult in such conditions.
Many associations have been formed during downturns and proved to be
subsequently most active at such times. Governments and associations often work
closely, which is a means of seeking opinions and diffusing policy for the former, and
an opportunity of lobbying for the latter. Examples of such reciprocity have been
recorded, for example, between Japanese governments and developmental
associations from the late nineteenth century.23 Governments have conferred on
associations various selective benefits, extending in some cases to compulsory
membership. This relationship has provided governments with opportunities to
pressure associations to seek improved economic performance by the sector in return
for these privileges of association. It also enables governments to monitor more
closely any rent-seeking activities.
Finally, ‘enforcement’ can come from other third parties associated with the
industry, especially associations in upstream and downstream activities eager to avoid
incurring the consequences of anticompetitive behaviour while encouraging efficiency
gains along the value chain.

3.

WOOL BROKERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND

Wool production and marketing in New Zealand
Debate on the role of industry associations is informed by rich historical
evidence from the New Zealand wool broking industry. After British colonization in
1840, settlers established sheep stations on the rich grasslands, and sheep numbers

23

Charles Sabel, “Learning by Monitoring” in The Handbook of Economic Sociology eds, Neil J.
Smelser and Richard Swedberg (Princeton, 1994).
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rose from 2 to 20 million between 1861 and 1901.24 With only a small domestic
population to feed, sheep were increasingly farmed for high quality wool rather than a
combination of wool and meat.25 Since wool has a low rate of perishability and is easy
to transport, it could be exported, initially to Britain but increasingly to Continental
Europe, North America and Japan by the early twentieth century. New Zealand
developed rapidly into a leading international wool producer, together with Australia;
between them they supplied two-thirds of British wool imports by 1870. Wool was
New Zealand’s principal export, accounting for around 30 to 50 per cent of exports
between the 1860s and World War One. Thereafter, its share averaged 20-30 per cent,
due to the expansion of dairy and frozen meat exports.26 Wool, gold, grain and the
ancillary services they generated made New Zealand one of the wealthiest economies
in the world in the second half of the nineteenth century.27
A series of technical and economic changes affected the production and
marketing of wool from the later decades of the nineteenth century. Technical
advances, notably improved stock breeding, sheep dips, machine shearing, fencing,
and pasture improvement, contributed to increased wool yields. Allied to technical
progress was closer settlement, as large estates were subdivided into smaller but

24

Gary R. Hawke, The Making of New Zealand. An Economic History (Cambridge, 1985), 32.
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Although the onset of refrigeration in the 1880s encouraged farming of dual purpose sheep.
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Geoffrey W. Rice ed. The Oxford History of New Zealand (Auckland, 1992, 2nd edn), table 4,
597.
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Hawke, 76; Angus Maddison, The World Economy. Historical Statistics (Paris, 2003), 60, 61,
67, 87, 100, 142, 146, 149, 180, 181, 188.
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economic farms, under pressure of government policy and a mix of high interest rates,
falling land prices and refrigeration.28
These changes created a class of small-scale sheep farmers who drew on a
stock and station agent in their local town for a range of business services including
finance, farming inputs, and technical and market information. The volatility of wool
prices, similar to most commodities, and the long lead times from shearing to final
sale in London, meant farmers often relied on their agents for seasonal finance.
However, the key role of the stock and station agent was to manage the marketing of
the farmer’s wool, normally for sale by auction in London. A long and complex
supply chain carried the wool from the farm gate to its purchaser in London, which
included overland shipment within New Zealand, storage and transshipment at the
nearest export port, sea carriage, receipt in London where storage, then display,
preceded the auction itself. The supply chain required careful management, to
minimize delays and damage, arrange appropriate insurance, negotiate shipping and
storage rates, and receive payment after the sale. These responsibilities were shared
between the New Zealand stock and station agent and the English importing agent or
broker.
In the final two decades of the nineteenth century a major market shift
commenced towards the local sale of wool in New Zealand prior to its export. The
geographic diversification of demand, improved international shipping services, and
the growth of the small farmer accounted for the relocation of the international wool
market from Britain to New Zealand and Australia in the late nineteenth and early

28

The economic development of the wool industry is detailed in Simon Ville, The Rural
Entrepreneurs. A History of the Stock and Station Agent Industry in Australia and New
Zealand (Melbourne, 2000), 7-13.
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twentieth centuries.29 Non-British buyers saw opportunities to buy directly in the
producing country rather than through London as an entrepot market, a process
facilitated by the growth of regular shipping services from New Zealand to European
destinations. Small farmers received prompt payment and stronger market signals
from local sales.
Local auctions had begun in Dunedin in the 1860s and Wellington in the
following decade, although sales were small and irregular until at least the 1880s.
Local selling spread among the major ports through which wool exports passed,
which also included Auckland, Christchurch, Napier, and Invercargill. Local sales
were fostered by New Zealand stock and station agents who saw an opportunity to
wrest control of the wool trade from larger and better-resourced British brokerage
firms. The New Zealand agents thus took on the role of wool-selling brokers located
in the exporting ports to auction wool prior to its overseas shipment.

Formation of wool broking associations
As more local brokers appeared, it became clear that the absence of a central
auction room that could sell a substantial volume of wool imposed costs on all parties.
Individual brokers conducting their own auctions, without any coordination of their
sale times with other brokers, duplicated physical resources and could not take
advantage of economies of scale. Buyers would spend more time travelling between
sales, and bid for a narrower range of wool.30 Growers would have fewer buyers at
each sale than if there was a central auction room, pushing prices lower. The brokers
29

On the Australian experience see: Simon Ville, “The Relocation of the International Market
for Australian Wool,” Australian Economic History Review 45, 1 (2005), 73-95.
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In Australia buyers exerted strong pressure for central salesrooms. Alan Barnard, The
Australian Wool Market, 1840-1900 (Melbourne, 1958), 154-5.
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wanted to reap economies of scale and scope, through selling related products such as
skins and hides. The buyers and growers both wanted the largest offerings at any
session and the most bidders.
Regional wool brokers associations, therefore, came into existence at the end
of the nineteenth century, with the primary function of managing the emerging central
wool auction at the major port of their region.31 The New Zealand Wool Brokers
Association (NZWBA) was formed in 1907 as the national industry body. The volume
of wool sold locally in New Zealand had doubled in the first six years of the twentieth
century, which reflected the continued expansion of production and the increasing
share being auctioned locally. In 1906, 47 per cent of wool exports were auctioned
locally, a share that rose to three-quarters by the 1920s.32
In order to continue the expansion of local selling, address the needs of major
overseas buyers bidding in New Zealand, and compete effectively with the London
market, brokers needed to put auction procedures on a secure footing. This meant
standardising practices into routines and inculcating norms to govern behaviour.
Therefore, while each regional association managed its wool auction, NZWBA
developed nationwide practices, coordinating between the associations in matters such
as the national sales roster, and communicating with other industry and external
bodies. Regional wool broking associations had emerged in Australia at the same time
and for similar reasons. However, a national body, the National Council of Wool
Selling Brokers, was formed at the end of World War One, to help dispose of the

31

For example, the Otago Woolbrokers Association was established about 1890-1. John H.
Angus, Donald Reid Otago Farmers Ltd: A History of Service to the Farming Community of
Otago, (Dunedin, 1978), 28, 41.
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Dalgety Annual Wool Review, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University.
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wool surplus. As a result, the regional bodies in Australia had become more powerful
and independent, and took on a wider range of tasks, often consulting with each
other.33 The existence of a dominant capital city port within each Australian colony,
the larger volumes of wool handled, and the problems of long distance
communication contributed to these different practices.
The richness of extant evidence on the wool brokers associations in New
Zealand enables a close examination of the debate about the role and nature of
industry associations. This paper details material relating both to the NZWBA and the
Wellington Wool Brokers Association (hereafter, WWBA), which includes minutes of
meetings, correspondence, associational rules and regulations, and conditions of sale
for wool auctions.34 The WWBA archive includes some copies of NZWBA
documents and reports on the latter’s meetings, which confirm the veracity of the
evidence. These sources have been underutilised, being used only briefly in the
standard history of the stock and station agent and wool broking industry.35
A national association of brokers was seen as ‘very necessary at the present
time…there are constantly points in dispute arising between buyers and sellers, which
can be more satisfactorily settled by the central association than if the buyers are able
to work off one [regional] association against another’.36 The wool buyers had

33

Simon Ville and David Merrett, “Investing in Interorganisational Communication: The
Melbourne Wool Brokers Association”, in How Organizations Connect: Investing in
Communication eds, Gordon Boyce, Stuart Macintyre, and Simon Ville (Melbourne, 2006).
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These records were deposited with the Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington when the New
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MS-Group-0489. Subsequent references will provide the item number and description.

35

Ville, Rural Entrepreneurs, 196-200.
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already organised themselves into a national association by 1907, and had a list of
issues to discuss with a body that could represent wool brokers. Far from seeing a
national representative of brokers as a threat, the buyers encouraged the formation of
the NZWBA as a sovereign governance structure, which could serve as an effective
communicating node to help improve the operation of the wool market. In 1908 the
New Zealand Wool Buyers Association (NZWBuyA) welcomed the formation of the
NZWBA, and almost immediately the two associations were locked in long joint
conferences that addressed a wide range of issues, including arrangements for
insurance, warehousing, presentation and weighing of wool, payment terms, and
delivery on board ship.37
While much of the NZWBA’s initial business involved negotiating the auction
environment with buyers, its role evolved and changed over the course of the
twentieth century. During both world wars the associations dealt regularly with the
New Zealand and British governments. In each case, the British government
purchased all New Zealand wool at an arranged price. This replaced the auction
system, and instead the wool brokers focused on the appraisal of each wool lot against
a table of limits to value it in relation to the unit price.
After each war, the associations worked with farmers, brokers and
governments to arrange an orderly disposal of surplus wool stocks as part of the
British and Australian Wool Realisation Association and then the Joint Disposals
Organisation respectively. During the interwar period, when the wool industry
endured a long downturn as a result of low prices, the associations’ focussed on

37

In 1910 the WWBA wrote to NZWBA with a list of 14 items to discuss regarding the
organization of wool sales. MSX 4323, WWBA letterbook, 25.5.1910.
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reducing costs, discouraging excessive competition among brokers, handling unsold
wool, and responding to the competition from new artificial fibres.
In the second half of the twentieth century, the role of the wool brokers
associations diminished. In part this reflected the progressive reduction in the number
of selling centres in New Zealand, which dropped finally in 1984 to a single centre in
each of the North and South Island. The introduction of Woolnet in 1999 (an internetbased trading system) and attempts by the New Zealand Futures and Options
Exchange to establish a wool futures market on the Sydney Futures Exchange (1988,
1991 and 2004) are further evidence of the decline of the regional public physical
wool market in New Zealand.38 In addition, the NZWBA was increasingly subsumed
within the New Stock and Station Agents Association (hereafter NZSAA, formed in
1933), which had become the peak industry association by the 1960s, directly
representing the dominant firms. Finally, governments became more involved in the
wool market through the New Zealand Wool Commission (1951) and its reserve price
experiments. This paper, therefore, concentrates on the wool brokers associations
during the first half of the twentieth century.

Membership
NZWBA’s membership consisted of the regional associations. Most
associations joined on its formation in 1907 but two of the larger ones, Christchurch
and Auckland, refused to do so until 1911. Christchurch noted that a previous attempt
to form a national association had failed as a result of ‘conflicting interests’. By 1911,
four years of successful cooperation among the associations and important progress in

38

Wool Research Organisation of New Zealand, “Wools of New Zealand. Buying New Zealand
Wool” (www.woolsnz.com), 1-6.
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resolving issues with NZWBuyA persuaded Auckland and Christchurch to join.
Membership density remained high throughout NZWBA’s history, bolstering its right
to represent local brokers and gain access to government, while mitigating the risk of
free riding on its public good role. The regional associations that were members of
NZWBA in 1911 accounted for 98 per cent of the wool auctioned in New Zealand.39
Applications for membership went to an election, with three black balls to reject. In
practice, there was no general attempt to limit entry, and fees were set at relatively
modest levels.40
The number of members remained comparatively small and stable, thereby
reducing the costs of administration and of securing cooperation on decisions. In 1911
seven of the eight auction centres had regional associations that were NZWBA
members. The only selling centre not a member was the small southernmost town of
Invercargill, which joined around 1914. The inclusion of Oamaru (1917) and
Wanganui (1921) reflected the greater spread of auction centres in World War One,
although several smaller temporary centres did not join. Oamaru excepted, the
remaining nine associations constituted the membership until after World War Two.
A contraction in membership in the latter half of the twentieth century was due to the
reduction in selling centres following amalgamation and rationalisation in the
industry. 41
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Membership of the regional associations was similarly small, stable, and
dense. It comprised the local wool broking firms selling in the major centres (town
members), and a country membership, with reduced powers and status, for local stock
and station agents who regularly sold or forwarded wool at smaller inland centres.
Thus, in 1911 seven associations representing 33 local brokers and selling agents were
members of NZWBA. The division between types of membership is indicated by the
fact that 24 of these 33 members were selling brokers at the major ports.

Figure 1. Industry associations in New Zealand wool broking

A group of wool brokers expanded nationally in the first few decades of the
twentieth century to dominate the industry; the top five brokering one half of the wool
auctioned in New Zealand, as indicated in table 1. They were: Dalgety, New Zealand
Loan and Mercantile Agency, Wright Stephenson, National Mortgage and Agency,
and Murray Roberts.42 Thus, the number of firms with membership of more than one
regional association became an important factor in the cooperative dynamics of
NZWBA. By 1911, 47 per cent (24 out of 51) of memberships of regional
associations were held by firms with more than one such membership nationally.43
No firm, though, individually dominated the wool broking industry or its associations:
18 per cent was the maximum national market share held by any firm prior to major
rationalisation of the industry in the 1960s. Nor did any of the regional associations
control the NZWBA, the maximum market share over the same period being 39 per
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cent.44 Leadership and direction, instead, was provided through cooperation and
mutuality of interest.

Table 1: Five Firm Market Share in New Zealand Wool Broking

Social networks and shared experiences reinforced these structural ties.45
Senior managers, representing broking firms, had similar occupational backgrounds
and shared experiences as long-term servants of individual firms with the same
heritage: Wright Stephenson and National Mortgage and Agency, for example, both
evolved as Dunedin-based agencies in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Regionally, many employees went to the same schools, social clubs, had worked as
landowners and sheep farmers and frequently moved between firms.46 This
propinquity was sustained by common challenges during the twentieth-century
lifecycle of NZWBA, which included two world wars and an interwar slump. Such
commonalities cemented the desire for active participation, which is revealed in the
records of high attendance at meetings, the almost complete absence of threats of
resignation, and an unwillingness to push divisive issues and minority viewpoints.47
While disputes arose among the associations, notably over commission rebates to
banks, freight rate rebates to shipping companies, and the length of the ‘prompt’
44

Ville, Rural Entrepreneurs, 33, 129.

45

See Ville & Merrett, for evidence of social ties among members of the Australian associations.

46

Ville, Rural Entrepreneurs, 60-1; Russell C. J. Stone, The Father and his Gift, (Auckland,
1987), 123-4. Allan L. Christensen, “Structural and Functional Evolution in the New Zealand
Stock and Station Agent Industry”, MA thesis, University of Auckland, 1986, 45.

47

In 1914, for example, WWBA backed down over the issue of bank rebates in the interests of
associational unity. MSY 4120, WWBA minute book .

22

period between sale and removal of the wool, these were relatively isolated compared
with long periods of cooperation over a wide range of issues, and were resolved
through open debate and majority vote. Thus, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’, rather than ‘exit’
or ‘passivity’, was the order of the day, which in turn heightened the association’s
social capital. Boyce has similarly shown how interaction through office-holding,
associational language, ceremonies and rituals helped bind group identity for the
Pharmaceutical Society of Australia.48
High density and cooperation were also the products of the benefits of
membership. Membership of regional associations enabled firms to participate in
joint local selling, which yielded scale economies in physical infrastructure and
marketing. NZWBA membership conveyed participation in the national roster of
sales, thereby avoiding clashes with other regional auctions. Many of the objectives
and outcomes of NZWBA discussed below were best or solely captured through
membership. Active participation gave members a voice in these matters and in how
the industry addressed major shifts in the external environment. Many years later,
when the closely related NZSSA discussed increasing its entrance fee, it believed the
new charge should reflect the substantial assets, especially goodwill, a new member
gained from an association built up over 60 years.49
Membership provided reputation guarantees for firms and associations. The
expulsion of members who repeatedly breached association rules or sale conditions or
were deemed guilty of ‘disgraceful or dishonourable conduct’, along with the
blacklisting of deviant transactional parties, helped to protect members from
opportunism. Graduated fines up to ₤50 and temporary suspensions distinguished the
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minor or occasional offender from the recidivist, and helped to balance the potentially
conflicting aims of high membership density and effective enforcement. Through such
rules, therefore, membership signalled trustworthiness and creditworthiness to other
members and to other transactional parties, particularly growers and buyers.
Associational mediation of bilateral disputes between members or
representation in disputes with members of other associations reduced the cost and
time involved in resolution. NZWBA’s constitution contained instructions for dispute
resolution through hearing cases at a general meeting and resolving by a majority vote
of members.50 The process was standardized, and members were well placed to judge
matters that were technical and specific to the trade. While NZWBA and its regional
associations could not claim to be professional associations in the manner of the
Pharmaceutical Society of Australia, they would have gained some additional
reputation benefits from setting standards and arranging classes for wool sorting in
local technical institutes.51

Objectives and outcomes
A mixture of broad and specific objectives are stated in the constitution of
NZWBA. On the one hand, it includes ‘the supervision and control of all matters
affecting the interests of wool brokers…selling wool in New Zealand’ and a catch-all,
‘to do and perform any other services’. Thus, the wide range of activities undertaken
by NZWBA in practice did not exceed its original remit, and its focus was on
supporting brokers selling wool in New Zealand rather than firms consigning to
London. On the other hand, it also included a very specific task, ‘to formulate…and
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vary…a standard minimum scale of charges and commissions for receiving,
warehousing and marketing wool’, which suggests this may have been at the core of
the brokers’ concerns in 1907. In practice, selling commissions and charges were
agreed with relative ease, and remained unaltered over long periods, the main
exception being during the interwar Depression, when there was intense pressure to
reduce costs and charges. A third objective, ‘to vary from time to time conditions and
regulations for the sale of wool’, became one of the main foci of the association’s
work.52 Overall, however, the constitution reveals comparatively little about what
NZWBA actually did as an organisation, which changed over time in response to
altered circumstances and through a growing appreciation of its own role and
potential contribution. The minutes and correspondence of NZWBA and its regional
associations provide a clearer account. These activities divide broadly into: enhancing
the auction system, market regulation, and industry representation.

Enhancing the auction system
Sale by auction provided sellers and buyers with many benefits, particularly
the breadth of wool choice for buyers and the prospect of many competing bidders
from the sellers’ perspective. In addition, it reduced the transaction and logistical
costs of individual sales through centralisation and the speed of clearance through the
auction bidding process. However, pushing large quantities of wool rapidly through a
series of discrete processes was vital to avoid upstream hold-ups. These processes
included receiving wool from individual farms into warehouses, its sorting, weighing,

52

MSY 4135, NZWBA. Rules and Regulations in NZWBA minute book. NZWBA also set
charges, commissions, and regulations for sale of skins, hides, tallow and sundries although
this appears to have been a minor aspect of their work in practice.

25

and display for inspection in showrooms, the conduct of the auction, the completion
of sale documents, outweighing, payment, and removal to an export warehouse or
shipping store for ‘dumping’ (compression), then delivery on board ship. Each
process was more complex than might first appear, with many grounds for
disagreement and dispute between buyers and sellers. Thus, there were many methods
of displaying wool, incurring brokers in varying levels of work and the buyer in
differing degrees of product information. Once sold, effective coordination of
weighing, document signing, payment and removal of the wool were all vital, and had
to be tied to changes in ownership and responsibility for insurance to avoid disputes.
External causes of outward delays such as transport movements were further
complicating factors.
A national association unencumbered by the day-to-day responsibility of
managing an individual auction, but which incorporated the experiences of
associations and firms that did, provided an appropriate forum for developing
standardised and detailed procedures. The strong associative capacity of NZWBA,
and the support of NZWBuyA, created an institutional environment in which progress
could be achieved towards the development of routines by codifying standard
practices into the conditions of sale document, which was regularly updated. These
included providing definitions of key terms, personnel and procedures. Thus, for
example, an accurate definition of ‘delivery’ clarified the point at which a broker’s
legal and financial responsibility for the wool was discharged. Previously, duplication
or even triplication of insurance had occurred among broker, buyer, and even
shipowner.53 Each procedure was now clearly explained. Flexibility was built in by
explaining alternative scenarios at particular stages and by providing ways of
53
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resolving residual sources of uncertainty. Thus, it explains the procedure when either
broker or buyer removes the sold wool, and lists alternative payment procedures.54
Dispute resolution procedures are outlined in the event of internal failure, such
as a buyer not completing the transaction or ‘false packing’ by the broker; or for
external failure, such as industrial strikes or transport delays. Since resolving disputes
took up association time, measures were implemented to reduce the risk of disputes
occurring or becoming protracted. Of particular importance was the keeping of
accurate and independent documentary records by the associations and mutual
monitoring between transacting parties. For example, each broker had to supply two
booking clerks to another broker, ‘the catalogues taken by them to be signed and
handed to the Chairman, and to become the property of the [local] association’.55 For
important clauses, a mutual deed of covenant was signed by members and a bond
submitted, which was forfeited in the case of a breach. If all else failed, NZWBA
reverted to the dispute resolution procedures in its constitution.

Market regulation
There is no evidence in its records of NZWBA or its regional associations
persistently manipulating the market by restricting the supply of wool for sale,
although finding such material is always problematic.56 Nor is there evidence of fixing
the price of wool, of which their commissions were a percentage.57 This is perhaps
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unsurprising in light of the discipline imposed by the external environment. New
Zealand’s share of a large competitive international wool market was less than 10 per
cent, while a further 25 to 30 per cent was sold by Australia.58 Wool also faced
increasing competition from synthetic fibres by the 1920s. Instead, brokers and their
associations supported an unfettered free market, and were vocal in their opposition to
post-World War Two government proposals for price or output controls.59 While fear
of government regulation may have stirred NZWBA to make public statements, the
NZWBuyA was the strongest external source of enforcement. Not only did the two
associations work closely together, monitoring each other’s positions and actions, but
NZWBA members realised that collective selling might engender collective buying.60
Some regulation of the market might have been justified on efficiency
grounds. Supply was highly unstable due to its reliance on the climate, while demandside volatility could be traced to two world wars and an interwar depression.
Moreover, the auction system involved substantial infrastructure costs that were fixed
and asset specific in nature, thereby requiring throughput above a specified minimum
level and of low variance. In this light, losses to the auction system through wool
consignments to London and private sales locally threatened its viability particularly
in the early years of small volumes. NZWBA acted as a powerful advocate of local
auction selling in the face of opposition from London importing houses and brokers,
and, locally, from some of the British and Australasian banks with substantial
interests in the London market. NZWBA instructed its members not to sell privately
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or consign and strongly discouraged other parties from so doing. NZWBuyA was also
aware of the disadvantages of market fragmentation, and supported NZWBA in 1916
by instructing their members to boycott brokers who sold privately.61 Extensions to
the roster season were partly designed to discourage private sales between auctions.
While achieving sufficient scale, neither should individual auctions become
too large, which could lead to logjams in the system and encourage growers to use
alternative marketing channels. Brokers were also concerned that large individual
auctions adversely affected prices and clearance rates towards the end of the sale,
when few buyers remained. Such a tailing off was noticed in the interwar years of
weak demand, and this led to negotiations with the NZWBuyA to reduce the size of
auctions.62 The NZWBA similarly held back wool from sales in the immediate postwar periods, when a large volume of unused British government wool flooded the
market.63 At the depth of the economic downturn in 1932, NZWBA instructed
associations to withhold from the media information about the volume of wool unsold
at auction and carried over to the next sale, believing such information would have a
depressive impact on prices.64
NZWBA and the regional associations in fact spent more time addressing
upstream market flows. Brokers relied on their rural branches, smaller stock and
station agents, and local merchants and traders to obtain wool clips and forward them
to one of the auction centres. In return, part of the broker’s commission, up to one
half, was rebated to the forwarder. Country membership of their regional wool
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broking association helped to generate an environment of full information and
cooperation with local stock and station agents. However, information asymmetries,
that the city broker had a limited ability to observe rural behaviour among nonmembers, invoked the risk of moral hazard. Thus, opportunistic groups and
individuals sought to present themselves as forwarding agents to claim a rebate.65
NZWBA’s constitution detailed the types of firm that could claim a rebated
commission, particularly that they held regular country auctions and generated their
main income from wool commissions. By 1918, aware that this failed to mitigate the
problem, it began to publish a register of bona fide forwarders.66 The issue of rebate
commissions was most difficult in relation to the banks, who, in return for providing
financial support to a grower and recommending him to a particular broker, expected
a rebate. The banks’ size, influence, and ability to forward clips alternatively to
London gave them significant leverage with NZWBA, which negotiated with the
Association of Bankers to establish a common set of rules: bank finance for the
farmer had to be long term in nature and the bank had to demonstrate that it had
previously shipped or forwarded the wool for several years.67

Industry representation
While NZWBA supervision of the wool market brought efficiency benefits
that spilled over into related industries (such as woollen manufacturing and
transportation), its advocacy role might fall more obviously into rent-seeking activity.
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However, much of this work can also be viewed as the NZWBA acting as a
communicating node. Enhanced contact with other organisations improved relations
and enabled mutually beneficial information exchanges. The value of its strong
communication lines with NZWBuyA was seen earlier, a policy which was replicated
to a lesser degree with other transactors in the wool trade. In 1928-9, for example, the
President of NZWBA visited the UK for discussions with wool buying houses in
Bradford and met members of the industry body the British Wool Federation. A wide
range of issues were discussed, which resulted in a clear understanding of one
another’s position and problems.68 Regional associations made contact with traffic
managers of New Zealand Railways when delays occurred in the movement of wool
cargoes resulting in improved working arrangements to the benefit of all parties.69
Additionally, NZWBA provided information to actual and potential buyers in an
attempt to build up the wool market.70
The associations communicated regularly with several government
departments. One might suspect rent-seeking motives, in fact much of the evidence
indicates broader benefits from the exchange of information and expertise. In 1927
the Department of Agriculture contacted WWBA asking for assistance in relation to
research it was conducting; it was seeking wool samples and broker and grower
opinions.71 Contact and communication lines with government were most active
68
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during and after the two world wars. NZWBA played an important coordinating role
in the transition to the wartime wool monopsony of the British government during
both world wars, and subsequently in the management of an orderly return to
peacetime marketing. As Kosmas Tsokhas has noted for Australia’s wool broking
associations, NZWBA played an important role in wartime negotiations between the
New Zealand and British governments over the terms of the wool purchase.72 After
World War One, congestion and delays resulted from the large quantity of UK
government wool waiting to be shipped from New Zealand ports at a time of shipping
shortages. In these circumstances, the 14-day ‘prompt’ period, between the auction
sale and removal of the wool by the buyer, was no longer tenable. In 1921 NZWBA
represented brokers at a conference on the question, which was chaired by the Prime
Minister and attended by the Minister of Agriculture. It resolved on a one-year
extension of the prompt to 28 days.73
NZWBA contributed to the strategic war aims of the New Zealand
government in 1914 by acting as a gatekeeper to guard against the sale of wool to
enemy nations. However, government policy became too heavy-handed with the
imposition of an embargo on wool exports to the US in light of evidence of re-exports
from there to Germany. WWBA contacted the Department of Internal Affairs in 1915
and recommended that export to the US be permitted where the shipper was well
known and signed a statutory declaration that no re-exporting would occur. After
some negotiation, terms were agreed for the issue of export alliances.74 At the same
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time, one can discern the defence of more narrow interests in NZWBA’s concern
about the market impact of wartime policies. They discouraged government’s use of
non-association brokers and ports and its depression of the post-war wool market by
offloading imperial government wool.75 In the absence of effective competition
policy for much of the twentieth century, the close relations between NZWBA and
government served as an alternative mechanism of restraint.76

Learning and adaptability
NZWBA proved to be an adaptable organisation that learned from experience
and modified its behaviour for new situations. Its constitution, proportional
representation voting system, record-keeping practices, and discursive culture were all
conducive to such adaptability. As discussed earlier, NZWBA’s constitution referred
to varying the conditions of sale and other objectives and indeed this happened, with
regular revisions to that document and the constitution. Early in the association’s
history in 1912, tiered voting was introduced between large (two votes) and small
(one vote) wool broking associations according to sales turnover.77 A similar tiering
was used by the regional associations between large and small brokers, while country
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members could only vote on matters relating to country sales. The detail of board
minutes and high participation rates testify to a discursive environment. In addition,
the detailed taking and survival of minutes, together with the large volume of
correspondence and accounts, testify to the strength of its corporate memory through
its effective record-keeping practices.
Many examples exist of NZWBA’s learning and adaptation. The impact of
war and post-war congestion on the length of the prompt was dealt with much more
expeditiously during and after World War Two through learning from the drawn-out
discussions in World War One. Another vexed question was the payment of rebate
commissions. NZWBA began by specifying the conditions governing permissible
rebates, then built on this by keeping a list of registered agents, and in turn it learned
how to be more discriminating about the list and the importance of updating it.78
Similarly, the national roster required significant amendments over time, which
included extending the selling season and organising separate North and South Island
rosters to mitigate private sales and congestion. The scale of charges gradually
became more detailed, in effect legislating and normalising a wider range of possible
scenarios. Procedures for monitoring sensitive activities such as weighing and
completion of sale accounts were enhanced and more clearly specified over time.79
NZWBA’s ability to modify its behaviour in line with shifts in the external
environment is best indicated by its changed role between wartime, Depression, and
post-war expansion as described in earlier sections. Most obviously, the centre of its
attention shifted from dealing principally with the wool buyers in peacetime to
working closely with the New Zealand and British governments in wartime.
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4.

CONCLUSION
The wool broking associations were established to facilitate the expansion of

local auctions rather than for defensive motives in times of crisis. They exhibited
strong associative capacity through structural (small, stable, dense and overlapping
membership) and cultural (social and behavioural linkages) properties, and from the
value attached to membership (operational economies and reputational benefits).
Further, their multi-tiered nature facilitated functional specialisation and learning
loops, the regional associations conducting day to day auction management and
providing feedback into NZWBA’s strategic decision-making and coordinating role.
The Australian regional wool broking associations came into existence in similar
circumstances. The national body, NCWSB, emerged later and never possessed the
same degree of authority, coordinating role, or specialisation of function. More
important were the endeavours of regional associations, such as the Melbourne Wool
Brokers Association, where social and geographic propinquity of members was a
paramount consideration in achieving progress.
NZWBA used its capacity, in the main, to pursue strategies of benefit to wool
brokers and their transactional parties, with positive spill overs more broadly as the
result of a more efficient wool market. These benefits were related to exchange by
reducing transaction costs in a complex auction system, particularly through codifying
information to standardise procedures into routines. Hierarchical costs were reduced
by monitoring to mitigate opportunism and the development of effective dispute
resolution procedures. Collective action problems of free riding on public good
consumption were mitigated by high membership density as the basis for industry
representation and the inculcation of cooperative modes of behaviour. This enabled
NZWBA to act as a representative communicating node with government and other
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organisations. Intervention in the wool market occurred only in extreme cases of
market disruption to provide smoothing effects, and through ongoing attempts to
counter upstream sources of opportunism. These strategic directions can be attributed
to its original motivations and the strength of enforcement pressures in the external
environment, particularly from the wool buyers, banks, government, and the highly
competitive international wool market.
What does the study of New Zealand wool broking reveal more generally
about industry associations? This largely positive account runs contrary to Olson’s
view that strong and enduring associations will pursue redistributive rent-seeking
ends. It lends support to Doner and Schneider’s alternative notion that strong
associations are preferable to weak ones because of their ability to mitigate the types
of market imperfections identified in the new institutional economics. However, this
does not dismiss entirely suggestions of anticompetitive behaviour in addition; by its
nature such behaviour is difficult to trace. Nonetheless, this study develops upon an
emerging revision in the historical literature that associations can help to strengthen
markets. It does so by explicitly applying the recent insights of the new institutional
economics on associations to the contingent circumstances of history. Thus, a strong
associative capacity generated a cooperative environment within the associations,
while external enforcement pressures, both within and outside the industry, guarded
against opportunism. Where these internal and external conditions are not met,
different outcomes are probable.
The perspective of history additionally provides a dynamic view of
associations absent in the theoretical literature and largely neglected by previous
historical research that focussed upon the short term crisis management role of
associations. While Olson perceives associational longevity as reinforcing their
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redistributive role, our study suggests that associations can evolve as flexible learning
organisations, regularly amending their rules and structures, routinising procedures,
and responding flexibly to environmental change. A further possible insight,
therefore, is whether associational governance provides greater flexibility to learn and
adapt than is common within hierarchical enterprises. The learning process was aided
by an organisational complexity, not revealed in previous historical studies of
associations, which separated strategic from operational management tasks.
There may still be a sense in which these ‘benevolent’ associations have a
sclerotic impact on a nation’s economic development, as described by Olson, through
their ability to prolong an industry’s lifecycle. Association-generated efficiency gains
may retard resource reallocation to new high-growth industries that lack such
organisations. Since associations often emerge beyond the initial growth stages of an
industry, and manifest learning abilities over time, they may be most potent in the
sunset period of an industry. Associations, by definition, promote the interests of a
particular industry or sector rather than seeking diversifying opportunities. Indeed,
their associative strength may weaken their absorptive capacity, that is, openness to
external ideas and solutions.80 Organisations that develop effective internal systems
are often less receptive to outside ideas because their culture and focus is essentially
inward-looking.81 Alternatively, industry associations can help to orchestrate
effective rationalisations and an orderly retreat from a contracting industry, a view
that resonates with their interwar role in many nations.
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Table 1: Five Firm Market Share in New Zealand Woolbroking
Year
1901-10
1911-20
1921-30
1931-40
1941-50
1951-60
1961-70
1971-80

5 firm
0.51
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.49
0.53
0.64
0.70

Sources: Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University, Dalgety’s
Annual Wool Review, Australasian Insurance and Banking Record.
Note: Market fraction held by leading firms. Ten-year averages
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Figure 1. Industry associations in New Zealand wool
broking
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